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East Germany’s Wage Gap:  









East German wages have been below the West German wage level since 
unification. Moreover, the East-West wage gap implied by the contractual wages 
specified in collective wage agreements is drifting ever further apart from the wage 
gap in terms of effective wages. This paper looks at the role of 
establishment-specific factors — such as sectoral affiliation and size of the labour 
force  — in this process. A non-parametric decomposition that has played a 
prominent role in the gender wage-gap literature is applied to breakdown the East-
West wage gap into its constituent components. Using establishment data from the 
German employment statistics, the paper demonstrates that the divergence between 
wage agreements and effective wages is probably not a consequence of a massive 
escape from collective wage agreements, or the intense use of opt-out clauses in 
such agreements in East Germany. Rather, the shift of East Germany’s economic 
structure towards lower-paying types of companies has caused the lagging behind in 
the adjustment of wages. 
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1 Focus 
In the economic policy debate concerning East Germany’s economic catching-up 
process, wage differences between the old and new Federal States of Germany are 
very much at the forefront. Information on differences in wage agreements between 
trade unions and employers' organisations in East and West Germany are published 
regularly by the wage agreement database  (HBS, 2004). From these, National 
Accounts calculations for the Federal States (VGRL, 2004) on employees’ effective 
income differ substantially with regard to the findings on wage adjustment (cf. Table 
1). 
Table 1: Relative Wage Levels in East Germany according to Wage Agreements and Effective 
Outcome 1992 - 2002 
1992 73,0 67,7
1993 80,0 74,2 7,0 6,5
1994 84,0 77,2 4,0 2,9
1995 86,0 79,1 2,0 1,9
1996 89,0 79,5 3,0 0,5
1997 90,0 79,8 1,0 0,2
1998 91,0 80,1 1,0 0,4
1999 91,5 80,9 0,5 0,7
2000 91,9 81,3 0,4 0,4
2001 92,3 81,2 0,4 -0,1
2002 92,8 81,2 0,5 -0,1
1Wage Agreements Database of the Hans-Böckler Foundation. -
² National Accounts for German Federal States.
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Following unification, the convergence process in terms of wage levels initially 
showed great dynamism. Both, the wage agreement data base and federal states 
national accounts statistics on effective wage levels show that this developed at very 
similar speed until 1995, i.e., wage agreements and effective wage adjustment 
progressed more or less in tandem. This development, however, changed 
dramatically during the second half of the 1990s. In terms of wage agreements, the 
speed of wage adjustment has been described as being much higher since 1996 
than can be calculated from effective wage levels found in the national accounts 
statistics. For 2002, the wage agreement database shows an adjustment of East 
German wage agreements to just below 93% of Western German wage levels. 
According to the effective figures calculated from the national accounts statistics this 
figure stood at only 81% for the same period.   3
Deviations between wage agreement and effective wage level adjustments can 
indicate differences in the degree of wage drift (i.e., the extent to which remuneration 
exceeds wage agreements), the overall extent of adherence to collectively agreed 
wages, as well as the different usage of wage opt-out clauses by West and East 
German firms. However, the difference between wage agreement and effective wage 
level adjustment may also be due to structural differences. This relates, for one, to 
differences in the qualification structure of employees, and, for another, to 
differences in the type specific composition of firms in the East and West German 
economies. 
This paper focuses in particular on the influence of differences in the type specific 
composition of firms, or establishments, on the drifting apart of wage agreements 
and effective wage levels between East and West Germany. It first outlines the 
present state of empirical research on the significance of firm-specific or 
establishment-specific factors for explaining wage differences. To quantify the 
influence of establishment-specific factors  — such as type of industry and 
establishment size  — on wage differences between the East and the West of 
Germany, a nonparametric decomposition approach is applied to establishment level 
data. This decomposition has until now been used in particular to explain gender 
wage differentials. Using a comprehensive data base derived from the employment 
statistics of the federal labour agency, it is possible to demonstrate that the drift of 
wage agreements and effective wage levels, as observed since 1996, can be 
explained by different changes in the type specific composition of firms in both parts 
of the country. 
2 Wage Level Determinants  
Descriptive empirical evidence on individual wage levels has led to the heuristic 
understanding that there are substantial differences in the remuneration for work 
performed. Within the model of perfect competition, this can be explained only with 
the heterogeneity of the labour input. If it were possible to adequately measure 
labour input in all its dimensions, then in principle it should be possible to explain all 
differences in remuneration through employees’ marginal product. In this case, the 
divergence between East and West Germany, with respect to wage levels, would be 
entirely due to the different composition of the labour force within companies in both 
parts of the country with regard to employees’ productivity. However, it is widely 
recognized that labour markets in both East- and West Germany are chracterized by 
numerous regulations, as well as a system of collective bargaining on levels and 
structures of wages between trade unions and employers' associations. They are 
thus hardly compatible  with the assumption of perfect competition.    4
In addition, any empirical test of the relevance of the theoretical model of perfect 
competition is necessarily restricted by the limited degree to which the heterogeneity 
of the labour input can be measured: in general, collecting adequate empirical 
information on employees’ marginal products is extremely difficult.2 The insufficient 
information concerning the heterogeneity of the labour input arises, on the one hand, 
because certain quality differences among employees, which influence productivity, 
cannot be detected in statistical surveys (Murphy and Topel, 1990). The company 
employing the workers, on the other hand, may very well be in the position to assess 
the quality of its employees. The company is therefore also often willing to pay a 
remuneration that corresponds to that quality — or to influence the quality delivered 
by the employees through the remuneration paid. This consideration is, for example, 
an important element in the efficiency wage approach (Akerlof, 1988). A further 
reason for the inadequate assessment of the heterogeneity of labour input is due to 
the fact that the actual heterogeneity is improperly homogenised by statistical 
classifications or by the use of proxy indicators. 
Krueger and Summers (1988), however, throw serious doubt on the significance of 
unmeasured differences in the quality of labour to explain wage differences. By using 
improved micro-econometric methods and especially by applying improved and more 
comprehensive employer-employee data sets, it has become increasingly possible to 
establish the importance of unobservable differences between workers for explaining 
observed differences in their remuneration. Using a data set based on an employee 
survey in France, a recent study by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) concludes 
that wage differences for the most part can be explained by personal differences 
among employees. However, the applied methodical approach has been criticised by 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999). These authors have found that, for 
Switzerland, size-specific differences constitute only 50 percent of employees’ 
individual and personal characteristics. Goux and Maurin (1999), although 
emphasizing personal factors in explaining inter-industrial wage differences in 
France, nevertheless suggest that wage differences discernible within an industry are 
due to factors such as capital intensity and company size. Burda (1991) presumes 
that a considerable part of unexplained wage differences in ordinary reduced-form 
wage equations are due to insufficient information, and cautions against excessive 
interpretation of the estimated inter-industrial wage differences based on these 
methods. 
A large number of more recent empirical studies comes to the conclusion that actual 
differences in  the level of wages cannot be satisfactorily explained with the 
heterogeneity of labour input, whether observable or not. The data sets used in these 
                                            
2 Occasionally a deus ex machina approach of measuring marginal products employs the relevant 
price information itself. However, such an approach not only relies on assuming perfect competition but 
is also ruled out in situations, where it is precisely this assumption that is to be examined.   5
analyses are very different in terms of both their scope and origin. Despite this, many 
analyses conclude that firm-specific differences can explain a significant fraction of 
observed wage differences (Krueger and Summer, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1991; 
Dickens and Katz, 1987). This leads to the theoretically inevitable conclusion that the 
model of perfect competition should be rejected in such cases (Blanchflower, Oswald 
and Sanfey, 1996). 
Depending on the data set used and the method applied, the extent of the influence 
of firm-specific wage-level determinants is assessed differently. Especially the weight 
attributed to observable and non-observable firm-specific heterogeneity, respectively, 
varies with the method used; however, it also depends on the type and scope of the 
control variables employed, as well as on the respective region studied. A recent 
study based on an employer-employee data set for the state of Washington has 
found that approximately 50 percent of the observable wage differences can be 
explained by firm-specific factors (Abowd and Kramarz, 2000). 
Industry and firm size are frequently singled-out as the most important firm-specific 
determinants on the level of individual wages  - even in studies that employ a 
multitude of control variables. This has been also established  — although not in 
every case — for East and West Germany (Bellmann and Kohaut, 1999).  
Numerous theoretical explanations exist for the influence of a company’s sectoral 
affiliation on employees’ wages. On the one hand, there are institutional conditions 
on the input side, such as trade union power or the existence of a works council 
(Hübler and Jirjan, 2004). On the other hand, product market forces (Blanchflower, 
Machin 1996; Jirjahn and Klodt, 1999), especially competition conditions (Nickell, 
Vainiomaki and Wadhwani, 1994) are being emphasised. 
Increased attention is also being paid to the closely connected question of implicit 
employee-employer rent-sharing (Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Hildreth 
and Oswald, 1997). Fakfakh and FitzRoy (2002) have, based on a data set for 
France with numerous control variables, been able to demonstrate such an effect. 
Margolis and Salvanes (2001) conclude that, for France, the strong link 
demonstrated in the raw data between profits and wages cannot be ruled out by 
alternatives to the rent-sharing hypothesis. The latter has been explicitly confirmed 
by them with Norwegian data. 
It seems certain that the industry-specific wage differences remain remarkably 
persistent over time and that structures are remarkably similar across countries 
(Krueger and Summers, 1988). This is also true for the c omparison of wage 
structures in France and Washington State (Abowd and Kramarz, 2000). While 
distinct differences have been noted with regard to regulated industries in France, 
recent studies (Grundig and Pohl, 2003) on the new Eastern European market   6
economies have found remarkably similar inter-industry wage structures in these 
countries. 
Similarly, the influence of  firm size on wage levels seems very stable in an 
international comparison, and robust in the face of a number of other additional 
explanatory variables of conventional wage equations. In fact, the correlation seems 
to have become stronger (Gerlach and Hübler, 1995). Explanations for the influence 
of firm size on wage differences include, among others, implicit employee-employer  
rent-sharing, the complementarity of factor inputs, as well as monitoring costs, which 
both vary with firm size (Troske, 1999). 
Brown and Medoff (1989) conclude that employees in larger companies exhibit a 
different quality (both measured and unmeasured) from those in smaller companies. 
Based on their research, however, only about 50 percent of observed wage 
differences are due to this personal influence. Further explanations are possibly 
monopsonistic demand conditions (Green, Machin and Manning, 1996). Idson and Oi 
(1999) argue that higher wages in larger companies are due to technological factors, 
employee preferences, and working conditions. In a recent longitudinal analysis, 
based on an employer-employee data set for France, Abowd and Kramarz (2000) 
conclude that 70 percent of the size-specific wage differences between companies in 
the raw data are the result of firm-specific factors. 
Even if differences remain in the assessment of whether these relations are causal, 
research to date does seem to confirm that firm-specific factors play a considerable 
role in explaining differences in wage levels, and that these can, to a large extent, 
explain both industry-specific and firm size-specific wage differences. Thus, for a 
comparison of economic structures in the East and West of Germany, 
establishments have been standardised by differentiating between the industry to 
which they belong and the size of their work force. 
3 Methodology 
Starting point of our empirical analysis is the simple „raw“ difference between the 
average wage level in the West,  [|] EYWest , and the average wage level in the East, 
[|] EYEast . This simple average wage difference  [|] EYWest - [|] EYEast  is the focus 
of the public debate on this issue. It is computed as the difference of the average 
wage paid by all establishments found in the West and the average wage paid by all 
establishments found in the East. It is, however, only a very crude measure of the 
relative wage setting in both parts of the country. In particular, it is not the same as 
the average East-West wage differential between comparable enterprises. This is 
visualized in the Venn diagram of Figure 1.   7
 
Graph: Venn diagram of the sets of all possible and all existing types of establishments. 
This diagram shows the set of all conceivable types of enterprises as a rectangular 
box. Some of the theoretically conceivable establishment types are neither found in 
the East nor the West (“neither East nor West”). Certain kinds of establishments, 
however, are only observed in the West (“West Only“”) and, therefore, their wages 
are included in the Western average  [|] EYWest  only. Similarly, certain types of 
establishments (and the associated wages) are found in the East only (“East Only”). 
Both “exclusive” groups of establishments have an influence on the average wage in 
their own particular region only and contribute in this way to the difference 
[|] EYWest - [|] EYEast . 
Conversely, the intersection “East and West” contains all establishment types found 
both in the E ast and in the West. These constitute, according to the particular 
classification of enterprises chosen, the set of comparable establishments. The 
East-West wage differential between the members of this set is therefore but one 
component of the “raw” difference  [|] EYWest - [|] EYEast . Establishments belonging 
to the intersection of Eastern and Western establishment types do not only influence 
the difference  [|] EYWest - [|] EYEast  because observably identical establishments 
pay different wages in the West than in the East. They influence 
[|] EYWest - [|] EYEast  in another way: the distribution of characteristics among the 
members of this set is potentially different in both parts of the country. That is, while 
large establishments in manufacturing may be found both in the East and in the 
West, their share among all enterprises in their region may be much higher in the 
West than in the East.  
   8
The informal discussion of the previous paragraph is made precise by the following 
decomposition proposed by Nopo (2002), who  – building on the seminal work of 
Blinder (1973) and Oxaca (1973)  – has shown that the difference  [|] EYWest - 
[|] EYEast  can be broken down into four additive components3: 
[|][|] WestEastDistReg EYWestEYEast -=D+D+D+D  
Each of  these components is closely connected to one of the shaded areas in 
Figure 1. 
Now let  ) (x g
W  and  ()
E gx  denote the average wage in the West and East, 
respectively, for establishment type x and let  ) (x f
W  and  ) (x f
E  denote the 
corresponding fractions of establishments of type x in the West and East, 
respectively. Using this notation, the unconditional average wage in each region can 
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The four components comprising the difference between  [|] EYWest  and  [|] EYEast  
can now be shown to have the following precise form and interpretation:  
The first component,  West D , is the component specific to the West and corresponds to 
subset  WO of Figure 1. It is the part of the simple West-East average wage 
differential that can be attributed to those types of establishments that can be found 
exclusively in the West.  West D  is formally defined as the difference between the 
average wage of the kinds of establishments found in the West only, and the 
average wage of those Western establishments, whose type is also observed in the 
East, weighted by the fraction of Western establishments with no match in the East, 
( )
W PWO : 
                                            
3 Nopo (2002) discusses how this decomposition and the estimation of its components are tied to the 
literature on estimating (causal) treatment effects from nonexperimental data, in particular by using 
statistical matching. See also the related decomposition of the selection bias in Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith and Todd (1996).     9













The second component,  East D , is the component specific to the East and 
corresponds to subset EO of Figure 1. It is the part of the simple West-East average 
wage differential that can be attributed to those types of establishments that can be 
found exclusively in the East.  East D  is formally defined as the difference between the 
average wage of Eastern establishments whose type can also be found in the West, 
and the average wage of those Eastern establishments, whose type is exclusively 
observed in the East, weighted by the fraction of Eastern establishments with no 
match in the West,  ( )
E PEO :  
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The third component,  Dist D , corresponds to the subset  WAE of Figure  1 and 
represents the part of the simple East-West wage differential, that can be attributed 
to unequal distributions of common establishment types in both parts of the country. 
That is, it arises from the fact that some establishment types are found both in the 
East and the West – but with unequal relative frequencies. Formally,  Dist D  is the sum 
of the type-specific average wages in the West, weighted by the difference of the 
distributions with which these establishment types are observed in the West and 
East, respectively4: 









D=- ￿  
The fourth component,  Reg D , also corresponds to subset  WAE of Figure 1 and 
represents the part of the simple wage gap  [|] EYWest - [|] EYEast , that can be 
attributed to the East-West differences in the wage of the establishments found in 
both parts of the country  – i.e., to the “true” regional wage differential between 
observationally identical establishments.  Reg D is formally defined as the sum of the 
                                            
4 Formally, the wage gap between the two parts of the country could be defined by reversing the order, 
i.e. by considering  [|] EYWest -  [|] EYEast . Reversing the order of the regions implies changes in 
the precise definitions of  Dist D and Reg D . However, the particular order “West minus East” is suggested 
by the aim of  the present paper: studying the adjustment of Eastern wages towards the reference level 
of Western wages.    10
type-specific East-West wage differentials, weighted by the fraction with which each 
type is found in the East: 
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Each of the formal definitions of the four components of  [|] EYWest - [|] EYEast  
involves the conditional expectation functions  ) (x g
W  and  ()
E gx . These functions 
spell out how average wages in the West and East, respectively, vary with the 
establishment type x. Note that no particular functional form has been assumed for 
either  ) (x g
W  or  ()
E gx . Instead, both regression functions are nonparametrically 
defined and estimated – the latter by computing average wages for each type of 
establishment (and each region) separately.   
Alternatively, the regression functions  ) (x g
W  and  ()
E gx  could be defined and 
estimated parametrically, for instance, by assuming that average wages vary linearly 
with establishment characteristics. That is, a more standard approach would impose 
that  x x g
T
W
W b = ) (  and  x x g
T
E
E b = ) (  and estimate the parameter vectors  T
W b  
and  T
E b  by Least Squares. While estimating and interpreting this specification is 
straightforward, its desirable statistical properties hinge on the validity of the linearity 
assumption. The approach followed in this paper, to specify  ) (x g
W  and  ()
E gx  
nonparametrically, does not require to impose strong a priori restrictions on the way 
average wages are allowed to vary with establishment characteristics. Moreover, the 
huge size of our sample (defined in the following section) ensures that the data-
hungry nonparametric approach has sufficiently large samples to work with to 
compute the many establishment-type specific averages that form its estimates of 
) (x g
W
 and  ()
E gx .       
The nonparametric decomposition defined above offers an additional advantage over 
the parametric approach as it explicitly includes the components of the raw 
difference in Western and Eastern wages due t o establishment types found 
exclusively in the West or East, respectively. The corresponding parametric 
decomposition due to Blinder and Oaxaca, however, yields expressions for  Reg D  and   11
Dist D  only.  5  It ignores the components attributable to establishments outside the 
“common support” of establishment types found in both parts of the country.6    
4 Data 
The ability to differentiate between “structural” components of the wage differential 
on the one hand (i.e.,  East D ,  West D  and  Dist D ) and the mere regional wage component 
( Reg D ), on the other hand, depends largely on the extent with which differences 
between the East and West German populations of establishments can be 
measured. 
Data sets containing representative and compatible information for East and West 
Germany regarding wage levels, industry and size of establishments is hard to find. 
Neither the available information from the database of collective wage agreements 
nor the information on effective earnings from the national accounts is broken down 
by sector and/or size. Other frequently cited sources for comparisons between East 
and West such as the Socio-Economic Panel (Burkhauser/Kreyenfeld/Wagner, 
1997), the Mannheim Innovation Panel (Rammer, et. al., 2003) or the IAB-firm panel 
(Bellmann, 2002) differentiate between these criteria but are inappropriate for a 
nonparametric decomposition of the wage gap due to their rather small sample sizes.  
Information on the wage level of their employees, their sectoral affiliation and the 
size of virtually all German establishments can be drawn from their mandatory 
regular notifications to the employment database of the Federal Agency for 
Employment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit/BA). This database includes all 
establishments with at least one employee making social security contributions. The 
database presently contains information about roughly 30 million employer-employee 
relationships and approximately 2.5 million establishments p er year. The survey, 
thus, covers far more than 90 % of all establishments and, therefore, is nearly a total 
census. These data are one of the central sources for the labour accounts in the 
German national accounting system. For this study, employment data from this 
source have been aggregated to the establishment level.  While this, in principle,  
could be done for any year, only the 1994 and 1998 data sets have been made 
available for this study.  
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 where  x 
denotes a vector of sample averages of establishment characteristics. 
6 It does so by using its linear functional form assumption to extrapolate into areas of establishment 
types not found in the data.   12
Despite its census-like size and coverage, the database has some shortcomings that 
are mainly due to its administrative origin (Fritsch, König, Weißhuhn, 1992). Since 
only employment relationships in the realm of the (largely mandatory) social security 
system are covered, certain persons and establishments, like the self-employed, are 
not included in the data. Additionally, high wages are top-coded, using the upper limit 
for contributions to the social security system.7 However, top-coded wages seem to 
be much more a problem for the comparison of individual wages than for an analysis 
of establishment-level wages.8 For the present analysis, therefore, it is assumed that 
such restrictions are of minor importance, especially since the central results refer to 
the changes over time in the level and decomposition of the East-West wage gap, 
and it is fair to assume that the shortcomings of the dataset have not significantly 
changed in the period under study. 
The wage level of each establishment is recorded as the average wage per day and 
employee.9 With respect to their industry, establishments are classified according to 
the sectoral code of the Federal Employment Agency following the Nace.Rev.3 
structure in 54 category groups (see appendix 2). Regarding the size, the firms are 
— based on the number of employees — divided into 10 size classes. This exceeds 
slightly the classification, which is commonly applied in the statistics on 
manufacturing (see appendix 1). In the combination, there are 540 cells, which can 
be used for classification of establishments and their employees in East and West 
Germany. 
5 Results 
Combining the selected characteristics (industry type and establishment size) yields 
a total of 540 possible types of establishments. Of these, 460 establishment types 
actually exist in East Germany in 1994 while roughly 500 types exist in West 
Germany (see Table 2).  
For both years, in East Germany the number of establishments belonging to a type, 
which does not exist in West Germany, is less than three. Reciprocally, in 1998 
nearly 500 West German establishments belong to an industry-size combination, 
                                            
7 As the wage levels between East- and West Germany differ, so do the upper levels for the social 
security contributions in the two parts of the country. Furthermore, the respective upper wage levels 
are dynamically adapted to the increase in wage levels in each part of the country. 
8 For all establishments, Görzig (1998) found that the average share of top-coded employees in West 
Germany in 1989 to be only 2%. Therefore, in comparing average wage levels of establishments, 
minor changes in the share of top-coded wages cannot dramatically influence relative wage levels 
between establishments. 
9 Since individual remuneration varies with the number of employment days, the average wage level of 
an establishment has been calculated with wages standardised as average wage per day.    13
which cannot bee found in East Germany. The latter group mainly consists of large 
establishments with more than 5000 employees in the chemical industry and in 
vehicle construction. Approximately 4 % of all West German employees are 
employed in these exclusively West German types of establishments. However, the 
overwhelming majority of all employees and nearly all establishments belong to 
those types of establishments, which are present in both parts of Germany with at 
least one establishment. 
The distribution of establishments and employees across the three cases (Types of 
establishments that exist “only in East Germany”, “only in West Germany” or “in both 
regions”) hardly shows any changes between 1994 and 1998. Based on t his 
typification, there are no signs that an economy has developed in East Germany, 
characterised by establishment types, which do not at all exist in the reference region 
of West Germany. Moreover, the number of employees in those types of 
establishments, which can exclusively be found in West Germany, is rather small 
and has not changed much in the years considered. A development towards two 
completely different specialised regions apparently has not taken place after 
unification in Germany. Nevertheless, there are remarkable structural divergences 
between East and West Germany because the relative distribution of the comparable 
types of establishments is different. 
Table 2: Number of Establishments and Employment Cases for different Types of 
Establishments in East and West Germany 1994 and 1998 
Type exists
only in West Germany    - 0,4        - 1170,1     43      
only in East Germany                *
1    - 5,4        - 1      
in both regions 473,2     1700,1     6872,5     25264,3     460      
Type exists 
only in West Germany    - 0,5        - 937,5     46      
only in East Germany                *
1    - 15,3        - 2      
in both regions 473,4     1746,7     6087,8     24550,7     458      
1 Less than 3 establishments.


















The difference between the types of establishments, which are exclusively found in 
East or West Germany, respectively, as well as the relative distribution of the types 
of establishments in both parts of the country have been quantified as structural 
components in the explanation of the regional wage differences (see Table 3).   14
In the base year 1994 the raw difference in the wage levels between East and West 
Germany amounts to 37,50 DM per employee and day. This is equivalent to a wage 
gap in East Germany of 27 %. Exclusively East German types of establishments 
hardly contribute anything to explain this wage difference. Conversely, the types of 
establishments exclusively present in West Germany considerably contribute to the 
wage difference between East and West Germany. This group of large industrial 
establishments pays wages far above the East and West German average. Without 
the influence of these types of establishments, the East German wage gap would be 
smaller by an amount of 1,90 DM per employee and day - which equals 5 % of the 
raw difference. Additionally, in 1994 there was a slightly higher fraction of 
establishments in East Germany paying wages below the national average. This 
component also contributes 1,90 DM to the raw difference between the average 
wage levels of East and West Germany. 







Difference in average earnings per day in DM
1994 37,5 0,0 1,9 1,9 33,7
1998 35,6 0,1 1,8 5,5 28,3
Changes on 1994
1998 -1,9 0,1 -0,1 3,6 -5,4
Sources: Federal Labour Office for Germany, Employment survey, Own calculations. 
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Dist D Reg D East D West D D
 
The decomposition in Table 3 also shows that the wage difference between East and 
West Germany in 1994 is only to a small extent caused by structural differences 
between the two parts of Germany with regard to their industry and size specific 
distribution of establishment types. Rather, nearly 90 % of the raw difference in the 
wage levels between East and West Germany result from the fact that comparable 
establishments (i.e., those of the same observable type) in East Germany pay less 
than their West German counterparts. That is, the genuinely regional component is 
the dominant part of the East-West wage difference.  
Four years later (1998), the raw difference between the average wage levels of East 
and West Germany has slightly decreased to 35,60 DM per employee and day. The 
influence of the truly regional component of the wage gap is still dominant,   15
accounting for approximately 80 % of the raw difference between East and West 
German average wage levels. However, its influence has considerably declined for 
the benefit of the structural components.  
This increase in the contribution of the structural components is almost exclusively 
due to the part stemming from the different distributions of common establishment 
types in both parts of the country. Compared to West Germany, the East German 
economic structure has evolved towards those types of establishments, which pay 
wages below the regional average. Compared to 1994, the share of the distributional 
component in the raw difference of the w age levels between East and West 
Germany has nearly tripled in 1998. The miniscule influence of exclusively East 
German types of establishments on the wage gap has almost remained unchanged. 
This is also true for the contribution of large industrial establishments with high wage 
levels, which only exist in West Germany.  
The increasing influence of the structural components as a whole on the East-West 
wage difference offers an explanation for the drifting apart of formal wage 
agreements and effective wage l evels in the middle of the 1990s. In order to 
compare the empirical results of Table 3 with the reference figures of Table 1, the 
former were expressed in the form of the index wage level in East Germany as a 
percentage of the respective West German values (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Wage Level in East Germany in Relation to West Germany, Different Sources, 1994 and 
1998 
Wage relation based on
Relative wage level in East Germany as % of West Germany
1994 84,0 77,1 72,4 75,2 97,2
1998 91,0 80,1 75,5 80,6 95,0
Changes on 1994
1998 7,0 3,0 3,1 5,4 -2,2
















2 National Accounts for German Federal States. -
1 Wage Agreements Database of the Hans-Böckler Foundation. -
3 
Federal Labour Office. -
Raw wage relation according to
 
The extent of the wage adjustment in East Germany between 1994 and 1998 implied 
by our empirical results approximately equals that derived from the National   16
Accounts. The change of the wage relation implied by the genuinely regional effect 
(5,4 percentage points), however, is much closer to the change in relative wages 
according to formal wage agreements (7 percentage points). The most important 
reason why the rapid adjustment process in terms of wage agreements was not 
reproduced by the adjustment in effective earnings apparently lies in the different 
developments of the industry- and size-specific establishment structures that 
occurred in the two parts of the country. Indeed, the diverging establishment 
structures in the Eastern and Western parts of Germany have caused the wage 
differential to increase by more than 2 percentage points between 1994 and 1998. 
6 Conclusions 
Nonparametrically decomposing the East-West wage differential into structural 
components and a genuinely regional component yields several insights into the 
process by which East German wages adjust to the West German level. Based on 
the purely regional component alone, the speed of the adjustment between 1994 and 
1998 hardly differs from that implied by formal wage agreements. The wages paid by 
comparable establishments (with regard to industry and size) appear to adhere to 
collective wage agreements in both East and West Germany. The strong divergence 
in the middle of the 1990s between the speed of East-West wage adjustment implied 
by collective wage agreements and that implied by effective wages (as measured in 
the National Account Statistics) therefore neither seems to be the result of a massive 
escape of East German establishments from collective wage agreements nor the 
result of their more extensive use of opt-out clauses.  
The analysis shows that the slower adjustment speed of e ffective wages can be 
attributed to the different shifts occurring in the establishment structures in West and 
East Germany. The adjustment of East German wages to the West German level 
according to collective wage agreements was at least in part offset by the concurring 
changes in the sector- and size-specific establishment structures. The East German 
economy obviously shifted towards establishment types paying wages below the 
national average.  
Hence, while establishment structures in East and West Germany are largely 
comparable, the shares of certain high-wage and low-wage establishment types 
have started to diverge. In the process, the new Federal States appear to have 
moved (in relative terms) towards being a low wage region – albeit a structural low 
wage region. However, this development has merely slowed down but not reversed 
the movement of East German wages towards the Western level.    17
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: East German wage gap in industries 
No.
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 00 - 03 85 80
2 Energy, water supply 04 161 79
3 Coal mining 05 158 87
4 Other mining 04 - 08 152 80
5 Chemical products 09, 10 137 70
6 Refining, coke 11 151 67
7 Plastics 12 104 69
8 Rubber products 13 107 66
9 Quarrying 14 120 72
10 Ceramics 15 105 73
11 Glas products 16 106 69
12 Iron and steel 17 140 78
13 Non ferrous metals 18 134 75
14 Foundries 19 123 73
15 Steel mills 20 - 22 102 67
16 Steel industry 23, 24 117 71
17 Machinery equipment 26, 27 130 71
18 Office and data processing equipment 33 127 64
19 Road vehicles 28, 29 110 61
20 Vessels 31 147 83
21 Aircrafts and spacecrafts 32 158 73
22 Electrical engineering 34 128 71
23 Precision and optical instruments 35, 36 107 70
24 Metal products 37 109 69
25 Furniture, toys 38, 39 81 64
26 Wood 40 103 71
27 Wood products 41, 42, 53 96 68
28 Pulp and paper 430 116 67
29 Paper products 431 - 433 107 71
30 Printing 44 119 72
31 Leather 45, 46 81 65
32 Textiles 47 - 51 83 62
33 Clothing 52 75 63
34 Food 54 - 56 82 68
35 Bevrages 57 138 83
36 Tobacco 58 152 79
37 Buildings and construction 59, 60 110 73
38 Auxiliary construction 25, 61 100 72
39 Wholesale trade 620, 621 114 73
40 Retail trade 622 - 625 86 76
41 Railways 63 135 86
42 Other transports 65 - 68  102 73
43 Post and telecommunication 64 133 107
44 Banking 690 159 87
45 Insurances 691 143 77
46 Hotels and restaurants 70, 71 74 83
47 Education 74 -77 121 77
48 Health 78 91 85
49 Cleaning, personal services 72, 73 63 77
50 Consulting 79 121 74
51 Other services 80 - 85 100 82
52 General government 91 - 94 136 95
53 Private households, NISPH 87 - 90 107 80
54 Others 109 75
BA 
Classifaction
Average wage per day 
1998
DM
% of West 
Germany
Industry
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Appendix 2: East German wage gap for establishment size classes  
1 1 77 94
2 2 - 9 86 80
3 10 -19 102 78
4 20 - 49 108 77
5 50 - 99 113 77
6 100 - 199 115 77
7 200 - 499 120 77
8 500 - 999 125 76
9 1000 - 4999 135 79




Average wage per day 
1998
DM
 % of West 
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